Within this period of 'labour quiescence', 3 the 1980 strike represented a rare 'victory' in an otherwise difficult period for the union movement, 4 'one of the most determined fightbacks against unemployment since the Conservative Party took office in May 1979, with some trade-unionists suggesting -rather optimistically -that it will be the [Margaret] Thatcher government's Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.' 5 One claim was that it showed 'that there is an alternative of fighting sackings to waiting three or four years for a Labour government'; 6 and the strikers argued that 'victory for the Gardners workforce would be an inspiration to all workers who detest this Government's policies'. 7 The 1980 strike prevented a large number of compulsory redundancies and was remarkable for the dynamism demonstrated by those involved: 'in no sense a clear victory against redundancy but it was a partial victory for some measure of shop steward control over the process.'
8 Examples drawing on the strike's organization were highlighted by John McIlroy in his manual on industrial action. 9 However, the firm's position deteriorated after 1980, with ongoing, mostly voluntary, redundancies, short-time working, victimization of key union activists, and the wider context of recession and falling demand for Gardner engines.
Based on archival material and interviews with participants, 10 Win (Pluto: 1984) . 10 Most archival material is from extensive holdings on L. Gardner and Sons in the WCML, Salford; strike materials held by Geoff Brown, a trade-unionist close to the dispute, including the diary of a senior shop steward, which are to be deposited in the WCML; and materials held by Tommy Macafee, convener during the occupation. Interviews with six participants were held in 2014-15, including two 90-minute interviews and numerous discussions with Carl Lingard, who worked at Gardner . I thank Carl and Geoff for comments on an earlier draft, WCML staff, and Tommy and others who were interviewed.
analyses the economic, political and industrial relations context of the early 1980s, before discussing the phenomenon of workplace occupations. The development of shop-floor organization and industrial relations at Gardner is then outlined, with particular attention to the incidents of industrial action. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the 1980 strike and occupation. The employer countermobilization in its wake saw the factory union leadership change and a more quiescent approach to the continual round of redundancies and eventual factory closure as Gardner's specialist engines were squeezed out of the commercial vehicle market.
Industrial change and industrial relations under the first Thatcher government
The 1979-83 Conservative government was marked by recession, the onset of legislative restructuring of industrial relations and a sharp fall in the number of strikes, so the 1980 occupation stood out as a significant act of resistance. 11 It took place at the height of the 1980-81 recession, when strict 'monetarist' policy (focused on controlling inflation through the money supply while tolerating high unemployment and marginalizing unions) 12 had raised exchange rates and interest rates. These placed constraints on manufacturing exports and investment, leading to public complaints from employers and the labour movement. Attempts to mobilize the unions in a campaign of opposition to legal changes, recession and rising unemployment culminated in a patchily supported Day of Action organized by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in May 1980; some strikes took place but its overall failure demonstrated 'the inability of the TUC either to challenge the government or to co-ordinate the actions of its member unions.'
13
Challenges to the unions in the 1980s were incremental: the 1980 Employment Act started the process but even the more draconian 1982 Employment Act (opening unions up to injunctions and damages) was viewed by Prime Minister Thatcher as inadequate. She complained of the persistence of the closed shop, union membership density of nearly 50% and 'too much socialism in Britain'. The labour process at Gardner was markedly different from that in carassembly plants, with less pressure to implement more unitary approaches that prefigured lean production. 35 The local engineering union district committee was frequently involved in disputes procedures in workplaces where pieceworking remained. 36 Shop-floor disputes were common and, in 1973 and afterwards, developed into much wider stoppages. 38 The 1980 Gardner strike was deemed to be successful, delaying mass redundancies and maintaining some union influence over staffing levels, but these gains were temporary and eroded by the wider context of recession and increasingly aggressive management. This capacity to resist was founded on nearly twenty years of workplace conflict at Gardner rather than a spontaneous reaction to the economic and political context of the period. Occupation represented 'a revolutionary tactic, albeit for reformist demands'.
Strikes and the decline of workplace occupations

39
A wave of high-profile occupations had taken place in the 1970s, including those at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (1971-72), Fisher-Bendix on Merseyside (1972), and engineering firms in Greater Manchester and elsewhere in 1972, but they became far less common in the 1980s. 40 Occupations in the early 1980s at Gardner, Meccano, Plessey, Lee Jeans, Caterpillar, Cammell Laird and Laurence Scott countered this trend. 41 But legal changes, employers' increasing use of injunctions and more interventionist policing made occupation harder to organize and sustain. 42 Many occupations in the 1970s assertively sought improvements in pay, working conditions, and in some cases experiments with workers' control, but in the 1980s were more typically a defensive last resort against redundancy and factory closures. 43 The 1980 Gardner occupation had both defensive and assertive features, opposing redundancies while demanding reorganization and work-sharing to survive the economic recession, framed in broader terms addressing regional unemployment, solidarity, and shared sacrifice. The wider significance of occupations can be overstated but the resolve, determination, and organization of the participants deserve to be documented and analysed. The events in the Gardner dispute broadly correspond to the framework set out within mobilization theory: perceived injustices led to the development of stronger union organization, with strikes playing a key role in mobilizing the workforce. Grievances about the confrontational management regime at Gardner stimulated recruitment to the union, stronger workplace organi-zation, the establishment of a closed shop and strengthened influence over job times and work organization. 44 Militant workplace trade -unionism and key activists were instrumental in directing these grievances into collective organization, with a leadership maintaining autonomy from, and a critical relationship with, the national union. Such approaches allowed for gains from the union side but have often led to repercussions. Counter-mobilization by employers and the state is highlighted by John Kelly but often underemphasized in accounts using this framework; these dynamics in the Gardner dispute are analysed below. 46 The role of shop stewards, their differing orientations and their integration within social networks, unions, and strike organization are also examined. 47 The specific nature of strikes is also important:
while the 1968 and 1972 strikes at Gardner started over victimization and the 1973 occupation was over pay, the 1980 strike was a reaction to compulsory redundancies. One analysis of strikes over job losses argues that they 'are notwhatever their slogans may suggest -aimed at preventing job loss. Rather, they seek to defend the trade union organization during the course of downsizing. 48 in mobilization theory, conflict fostered strong workplace organization and capacity to strike but was followed by management counter-mobilization, highlighting the difficulty of sustaining gains.
Strikes and workplace organization within Gardner
Prior to the late 1960s, Gardner management viewed itself as taking a 'paternalist' approach to the workforce: 50 The engineering union in this period was divided, with its right wing typically the source of its leaders and a majority on the full-time executive council and the policy-making lay national committee. Hugh Scanlon's term as president from 1968 to 1979 saw the broad left in the union strengthened, but, from 1980, under the leadership of Terry Duffy and John Boyd, the union's left was increasingly marginalized at national level. But the Manchester district was still heavily influenced by the broad left. 53 The divisional organizer, John Tocher, a relatively prominent Communist Party (CP) member, was a key figure who came to prominence during the 1966-68 Roberts-Arundel strike in Stockport and the wave of workplace occupations in Greater Manchester in 1972. 54 In the 1960s, wages at Gardner were lower than at comparable employers; fewer than half of the 2,000 shop-floor workers were union members, mostly skilled engineering workers in the Amalgamated Engineering Union, with lessskilled workers generally unorganized.
An account based on interviews with stewards described how 'most supervision were vicious and reducing workers to tears was not uncommon… A director once sacked a man on Christmas Eve for having his coat on early … Typically the steward would just stand there and watch you take a bollocking.' 55 A former steward who joined the firm in 1967 described union organization as 'pitiful', the workforce 'downtrodden', with very old machine tools used with belt-driven lathes: 'they looked scared … [W]orkers had no stomach for any change … [I]t's not just the equipment that's outdated but the feel of it.' 56 The personnel manager in place during the 1980 strike allegedly boasted that he had once sacked his own nephew. 57 Senior engineers who were closer to management indicated that this reputation was 'probably fair', although they felt that these conditions were exaggerated by the union side.
58
The relationship between management and workforce deteriorated during the 1960s. Under the leadership of T. F. Farrell, the works convener between 1963 and 1966, stricter limits were placed on overtime, apprentice training, and health and safety. Overtime bans and the use of the Manchester Piecework Agreement for the first time at Gardner in the post-war period forced an increasingly controlling, authoritarian management to negotiate over wages, but the firm reacted by moving Farrell to a different department for the ostensible purposes of 'production efficiency', after which he resigned as convener. 59 This context of assertive union organization, management reprisals and the enduring role of more moderate or quiescent shop stewards formed the backdrop for the series of disputes that developed from the late 1960s onwards.
The ten-week foundry strike, starting at the end of August 1968, was described as caused by disciplinary action over 'faulty workmanship' in an account based on shop stewards' committee minutes; 60 but an account using management recollections claimed a moulder in the foundry 'for some reason only known to him' had been casting the Gardner logo upside down on crankcases. 61 He was dismissed; 250 workers struck in solidarity and were dismissed themselves; many workers crossed picket lines during this dispute. During the 1972 engineering sit-ins in Greater Manchester over the national pay and hours claim, the Gardner workforce, which did not take part, voted to accept a deal involving a pay rise only half of that called for at the start of the regional dispute, with no concessions on hours or holidays. The Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) district committee refused to ratify the deal, arguing that it undermined the wider campaign. When Tocher announced he would address the workers, the firm threatened to invoke the 1971 Industrial Relations Act against him for inducing a breach of contract. 63 The meeting went ahead at a local bingo hall and reversed the earlier vote, despite workers having received the pay increase for the previous two weeks. Tocher argued that foremen had given out ballot papers: 'We did not consider the ballot was free from intimidation and therefore believed it was not binding on the members concerned'. 64 When, in September of the same year, a shop steward was ordered to move off his machine to be replaced by an apprentice, his refusal led to his dismissal and a strike by sixty-eight machine-shop workers. After five weeks, a meeting of laid-off workers agreed that supervisors could do the work of strikers. The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) district secretary then bypassed the convener, who was viewed as ineffective and too close to management, and called a mass meeting of AUEW members who agreed to join the strike. A district levy, to support the strikers, was proposed and threats made to block any Gardner products. Management capitulated after a few days, in early November, reinstating the dismissed steward and agreeing not to replace skilled workers with apprentices in future. More assertive union representatives were elected. Thus the 1968 and 1972 strikes were critical in establishing a stronger union presence within the firm.
This influenced the major strike and occupation that occurred in 1973. In an attempt to circumvent the pay policy of the Conservative government, 66 the workers demanded an increase in their production bonus. A work-to-rule followed, with day-work declared under the Manchester Piecework Agreement. Gardner and the EEF withdrew from negotiations, escalating the dispute and threatening participants in the work-to -rule and anyone else supporting the strike with dismissal (effectively a lockout), leading to a plant-wide strike and the occupation of some sections of the factory.
67
A number of manual unions made the strike official, but not the staff unions, unlike their role in the 1980 strike. 68 Some workers who broke the strike were reportedly attacked, in the loading bay, by occupiers with missiles, including bags of urine. 69 Engineering workers from across the city attended the pickets which were crossed by non-strikers under police protection; the strike was ultimately settled after fourteen weeks in June 1973. 70 Some stewards had broken the workto-rule and undermined the strike leading to the withdrawal of their credentials by their unions, part of a broader process of more quiescent union leaders being sidelined in the period to be replaced by more militant, assertive activists. The strike had also led many supervisors who had worked during the strike to join staff unions, such as the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS). 71 The strike did not fully achieve its aims but was significant in building stronger workplace organization, with an effective closed shop established after its end. 72 The 1973 strike was an aggressive occupation to improve pay and conditions, in contrast to the more defensive occupation of 1980. Union organization was strengthened, and an increasingly politicized leadership was able to sustain the factory occupation in 1980.
The Gardner family were 'disenchanted' and 'hurt' by the lack of loyalty they felt the workers had demonstrated. The owners had not expanded the company due to fears of losing control if they borrowed and brought in external directors, but also to maintain steady levels of employment, avoid forced layoffs during recessions, and to keep the workforce ostensibly more content. This lack of expansion meant that waiting lists for Gardner engines often exceeded twelve months during peak demand in the mid-1970s; the 1973 strike exacerbated these delays, and a number of truck manufacturers switched permanently to other suppliers during the dispute. 73 Gardner engines were typically more expensive than alternatives due to the use of higher-quality materials and the complexity of their manufacture, but were more efficient and durable than the competition; within a year of use a Gardner engine would typically save the difference in initial cost on fuel. 74 However, competitors such as Scania, Volvo, Mercedes, and DAF capitalized on Gardner's lengthening delivery times and strike disruption.
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After 1973, a pre-entry closed shop was established for skilled trades, with unskilled and semi-skilled workers expected to join a union when beginning employment. 76 The joint shop stewards' committee (JSSC) expanded to seventyone members at its peak, drawn from ten unions affiliated to the CSEU, including the majority AUEW, General There were relatively few disputes between 1973 and 1980; orders and demand for labour remained high, pay incrementally improved and a less confrontational approach to industrial relations was adopted by management. Piecework remained a constant source of conflict but this was common in comparable workplaces in the period. Behavioural scientists were brought in to work with employees in the late 1970s, with exercises emphasizing participation and co-operation but viewed sceptically by many: 'if the stewards were in a "co-operative" frame of mind … [rationalization plans] would be so much easier'; 80 'at one point they had us all on the floor playing with models, to get us in the right frame of mind but you could see through this, that was never going to bloody work.' 81 Gardner workers took part in the one-and two-day strikes, from August to October 1979, for the national engineering claim of significant rises in national minimum rates, reduced hours, and increased holiday entitlements. 82 The dispute, involving two million workers at its peak, resulted in a four-year agreement which included the symbolic reduction in the forty-hour working week (which had eluded the unions in the 1972 strikes and occupations) to thirty-nine hours from November 1981. This was viewed as a defeat for the employers and created major tensions within the EEF over national bargaining, which collapsed in 1989.
83
The major change between the 1973 and 1980 strikes at Gardner was the takeover by Hawker Siddeley, whose famous aerospace division was nationalized in 1977, followed by the acquisition of Gardner for £14.7 million in July of that year. 84 Twelve members of the Gardner family shared £5 million from the sale. The reliance on a very small design team centred around Hugh Gardner, a lack of marketing strategy or diversification plans, and some complacency regarding future demand for Gardner engines reflected wider tendencies towards short-termism (including a lack of strategic planning and long-term financial investment) that were a feature of many established British firms in the period. to the Conservative-affiliated Centre for Policy Studies and right-wing lobby groups and blacklisting organizations such as the Economic League, Common Cause, and Aims for Freedom and Enterprise. 86 A shop steward later discovered, through the journalist Paul Foot, that he, and others involved in the strike, were on the Economic League blacklist subscribed to by the EEF. 87 Hawker Siddeley initially pledged to avoid redundancies, but falling demand and a reactive, unilateral and short-term focused approach to restructuring ultimately provoked the 1980 strike.
88
The 1980 occupation and its aftermath
High levels of redundancies, factory closures, stricter disciplinary procedures, and increasing victimization of stewards were evident across British engineering during 1980. In mid-June, the Gardner workforce was put on a four-day week, with the firm applying for the state-funded Short-Time Working Subsidy; 89 over the summer some sections were working as little as one day per week. 90 Short-time working meant that management could demand that employees were available to work whenever required; workers could be visited at home by supervisors on layoff days and 'hauled' into work under the threat of losing the subsidy. These conditions increased tensions between management and the workforce and its unions, although a 'bizarre phenomenon' was noted where some younger workers preferred this arrangement as it gave them more leisure time. 91 In August, the unions presented a complex claim for the lifting of a bonus-rate freeze and a 20% increase, roughly in line with inflation at the time. Orders were low and while there were hopes that they would recover, the claim was met with a 5% offer, changes to the piecework system and 700 compulsory redundancies. Some 110 workers then left the firm under a voluntary redundancy arrangement, reducing the figure to 590 (520 manual workers and 70 staff), with 14 shop stewards and the convener on the list. On 5 September a mass meeting of 2,000 workers was addressed by Tocher and agreed (with only six against) that 'the workforce of L. Gardner and Sons will resist redundancy by taking industrial action if necessary, and call on the board of directors to withdraw their proposals in favour of a work-sharing agreement'.
93
Union officials reiterated to management that they were open to negotiations on voluntary redundancy and early retirement. The compulsory redundancies were described as 'brutal' but the personnel director, Geoff Howarth, dismissed this characterization as 'bullshit'. 94 The demand for work-sharing, described as 'a sharing of the misery of the membership' 95 and 'the right to share hardship', was felt by the personnel director to be potentially viable for a finite period but ultimately impractical due to the uncertain economic context.
96
The disputes procedure was started in September with meetings held under the auspices of the EEF-CSEU on 12 and 23 September, but without agreement. A mass meeting on 2 October endorsed the 5 September resolution and therefore to strike. The next day, a meeting of stewards and reps voted to occupy the plant 'in the tradition of the factory after the 1973 sit-in'. By 12.30 pm, the plant was shut down, management vacated the premises, and by 4.30 pm the entrances were sealed with a picket and lodge established at the gate. Management then used local media to indicate that discussions would not reopen until the occupation ceased, questioning the legitimacy of the strike vote.
97 On 6 October the convener led a delegation to AUEW headquarters in London: to ensure that the union honoured pledges by Gavin Laird, AUEW executive councillor, at the CSEU conference in September, to support members taking industrial action to save jobs; and to make the dispute official, thus releasing strike pay. 98 Typically, the union took between six and eight weeks to deem a strike official. Within two weeks, three delegations from Gardner had lobbied the union's leadership; the third threatened that if the strike was not made official that day 'there would be two sit-ins -one in Eccles and the other in the union headquarters'. 99 faced major problems. Single workers were not entitled to benefit and faced serious hardships, and under reforms to social security, the Department of Health and Social Security assumed that strike pay was issued from the outset of the strike, deducting this from benefit payments, leaving those on strike and their families on minimal incomes.
101
Morning pickets typically featured around 200 workers; around 500 would be sitting in at any one time, with around 200 'hard core' and 100 'very hard core' strikers at the centre of the occupation. Around 200 employees did not strike, including senior management, supervision, and some white-collar staff. Most TASS, APEX and ASTMS members respected the dispute, with a considerable number of activists drawn from these unions, but some were fined by their respective unions for ignoring their union's support for the occupation. 102 A letter appealing to non-strikers acknowledged the hardship, management intimidation, and press depictions of a 'terrifying' image of workers on strike, highlighting the 'organised, civilised and disciplined way' that the strike had been conducted and the callous approach of Hawker Siddeley to redundancy. 103 A strike committee was established, separate from formal union structures and open to all members not just stewards, allowing large numbers of women and younger male workers to participate fully in the occupation. The convener thought that 'it was amazing; the problem with that of course is that they got themselves really wound up for a fight … [T]hey had all this energy that they wanted to channel somewhere else, it was giving me nightmares about the return to work and the scabs that were coming back inside.'
104 Sub -committees dealing with picketing, administration, food, entertainment, publicity, safety, and delegations all allowed co-option of strikers to increase participation. Film showings were held and arts groups put on performances in the canteen.
106 A six-point code of practice for the occupation was drawn up, demanding that all visitors must be recorded and accompanied by a steward or Gardner employee; 'correct and proper' conduct; safety precautions and cleanliness; no damage; no stealing; and no alcohol. 107 Rumours circulated that the police would attempt to evict the occupiers; legal advice from AUEW solicitors advised that, provided 'factory discipline' was maintained and that there was no violence or criminal activity, then the firm would need an injunction, which was never pursued. The wider significance of the strike was increasingly apparent as it progressed; Foot, the socialist journalist, visited and wrote supportive articles; this coverage and wider solidarity boosted the confidence of the workers and increasingly framed the dispute as a protest against government policy, job loss and deindustrialization.
108
Management pressed ahead with plans to force a return to work. A postal ballot was organized, with a letter to all employees stating that two more weeks of lost production would cause permanent damage to the firm and necessitate further job losses. The ballot was a 'yes or no' response to the question 'Do you agree that a secret ballot should be arranged about a return to work?' 109 The regional EEF disapproved and told Gardner management that there would have to be a negotiated settlement, while unions accused Hawker Siddeley of attempting to 'trample on all recognised negotiating procedures by going over the heads of the union and shop stewards'. 110 It was feared that the ballot could be used as a means to delegitimize the strike as a precursor to a legal injunction and eviction.
111
The pessimistic projections from management were countered by the strikers, who discovered the factory addressograph, which had the addresses of all employees and within a few hours could print up to 2,000 addressed envelopes.
As the 1980s progressed, the occupation tactic was used less frequently. State and employer responses became more forceful, as in 1984 at Cammell Laird where occupiers faced injunctions, arrest and imprisonment. 155 Occupations against redundancy and closure in the 1970s could potentially draw on state intervention in the form of full or part-nationalization to preserve employment, an approach forcefully rejected by the Thatcher governments and constraining the potential outcomes of such action. 156 Interest rate rises after Thatcher's election meant the cost of loans from Hawker Siddeley wiped out Gardner's profits and contributed to the decision to impose redundancies. The focus on short-term results within the cash-rich, but precarious, parent company, Hawker Siddeley, following nationalizations and the loss of military contracts during the 1974-79 Labour government, further underpinned Gardner's 1980 crisis. The wider economic climate, the example given by managers such as Edwardes at British Leyland and the government's rhetorical attacks on trade-unionism, facilitated Gardner's counter-mobilization against union organization. The removal of key leaders and ongoing job losses, while implemented chaotically at times, represented a powerful form of retribution, highlighted by Kelly as a challenge to gains achieved through militant trade-unionism but often underrepresented in other accounts using mobilization theory.
